Xi Jinping's historical distortion: The communists claim victory against the Japanese occupiers. However, the Americans won the war.

Could it be that we Europeans have once again missed the highlight of an "imperial message" from the Middle Kingdom? In Chinese President Xi Jinping's speech at the gigantic military parade in Tiananmen Square a few days ago, he referred to the "80th anniversary of the Chinese people's victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the Global War of Anti-Fascism."

But wait – anti-fascism? That was a movement of the 1920s directed against the policies of Mussolini and later against the German National Socialists. What does that have to do with China? Who was actually fighting against the Japanese invaders in this eastern theater during World War II?

This May, at the Victory Day parade in Moscow, there was considerable astonishment when Vladimir Putin equated his war of aggression against Ukraine with the fight against Nazi Germany. The distortion of reality couldn't have been more absurd. So what was his "dear friend" Xi Jinping trying to achieve by using the term "anti-fascist war" a few months later? Mao Zedong had adopted this term from Stalin in 1941 to honor his great role model.

When people talk about World War II in this country, they think of Stalingrad, D-Day, and Auschwitz. Older generations sometimes even know what "Operation Barbarossa" was all about and the fate of the Polish attack on the Gleiwitz radio station, staged by the SS. But who can put the "Mukden Incident," a bomb attack on the South Manchurian Railway by Japanese officers in 1931, into historical context? Or can they recount off the top of their heads the circumstances of the "Hump," the American-organized airlift between India and China over the Himalayas?

When an incident between Japanese and Chinese soldiers occurred at the Marco Polo Bridge in Beijing in July 1937, it was not foreseeable that it would develop into an eight-year war with 20 million casualties on the Chinese side. At that time, General Chiang Kai-shek ruled the mainland. He and his Kuomintang, the "National Chinese," had successfully concluded the so-called Northern Campaign against warring warlords following the death of the republic's founder, Sun Yat-sen, and had achieved the formal reunification of the country in 1928.

This agreement, however, brought neither security nor stability: On the one hand, Japan, severely affected by the global economic crisis, sought to acquire vast territories in China as part of its colonial ambitions. This began with the occupation of Manchuria and the proclamation of the puppet state of Manchukuo in northeastern China in 1931. On the other hand, the Soviet Union also felt an appetite for territories that were weakly or not at all controlled by the Chinese central government. In 1934, Stalin ordered his troops to invade the western Chinese province of Xinjiang (present-day Xinjiang) to install the warlord Sheng Shicai, who was his sympathetic leader, as governor.

However, the greatest threat to Chiang Kai-shek and the unity of the country was posed by Mao Zedong and his communists. The conflict between the two most important adversaries in 20th-century China began immediately after the founding of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1921 and only led to phases of cooperation between the two parties through external pressure: for the first time in 1923 through the mediation of Moscow and the Comintern.

The "Shanghai Massacre" and the violent suppression of the communists in the spring of 1927 brought this "first united front" to an abrupt end. The communists retreated to rural areas to build their grassroots organizations and strengthen themselves. In the wake of the "Long March" of 1934/35, Mao and his troops succeeded in recruiting increasing numbers of soldiers to their cause and later also controlled large areas of northern China.

The "Second United Front," which lasted intermittently until 1945, came about following the so-called Xi'an Incident of 1936. During a visit to the troops in the formerly important imperial capital, Chiang Kai-shek was arrested by two of his generals (among them the drug-addicted Marshal Zhang Xueliang) with the support of Zhou Enlai, later Premier of the People's Republic of China. The aim of the operation was to force Chiang to focus primarily on fighting Japanese aggression and to refrain from attacks against the communists. Although Chiang was forced to submit to the will of his captors, the persuasion was only of limited success.

When it came to American support for China in its fight against Japan, Washington pursued a policy of non-intervention for a disproportionately long time. One reason for this was that the American economy benefited significantly from trade relations with Japan. As a result, China was virtually left to its own devices during the early years of the war. Only when the first news of the massacre by Japanese troops in Nanking became public in December 1937—in which 300,000 Chinese civilians and prisoners of war were brutally murdered—was the outcry in the United States enormous. It was decided to immediately support the National Government with generous deliveries of arms, equipment, and military advice.

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the US entry into the war in 1941, China was officially considered an ally—against the wishes of the British, who did not consider China an equal military power. President Roosevelt appointed the legendary General Joseph Stilwell as liaison to Chiang Kai-shek and, in 1942, Commander-in-Chief of the China-Burma-India Theater. Stilwell, who spoke fluent Chinese, was tasked with securing American supplies to the Nationalist Chinese troops fighting Japan in China.

However, conflicts repeatedly arose between "Vinegar Joe," as Stilwell was called, and Chiang Kai-shek. The reasons for this were their differing strategic and ideological views. Chiang saw the communists as a greater threat than the Japanese, while Stilwell called the generalissimo an inefficient softie. Furthermore, Chiang continually demanded more American military aid. Through the Lend-Lease program, China received military and other goods from the United States worth $1.6 billion (today's value: $21.5 billion). The Americans rejected China's request for US troops until the end of the war, with the exception of air support from General Chennault's "Flying Tigers."

Despite generous aid from the United States, Japanese superiority in China remained overwhelming for many years of the war. At the beginning, the Kuomintang had 68 combat aircraft compared to almost 1,000 of the Japanese occupiers. Militarily, the Kuomintang and its troops clearly bore the brunt of the war: over 3 million soldiers of the Nationalist Chinese Army fell fighting against Japan. In one of the last major battles, Operation Ichigo in 1944, losses amounted to approximately 400,000 dead and wounded.

The communists, who after the war liked to present themselves as the spearhead of the "People's War against Japan," deliberately adopted a defensive stance—apart from guerrilla activities. Only during the "Hundred Regiments Offensive" in 1940 did Red Army troops launch major attacks on Japanese transport and supply lines in northeast China. After initial successes, however, the Japanese retaliated vigorously. Subsequently, the communists resorted to the clever ploy of no longer participating in national defense and leaving the costly battles to the enemy Kuomintang. This strategic calculation would pay off after Japan's final defeat and the resurgence of the civil war.

By the end of the war in the Far East, it became clear to the United States that, despite knowing about Chiang's corrupt system and his inability to reform, they were at the mercy of his government. Washington also feared that Stalin, whose troops had invaded Manchuria and Inner Mongolia in August 1945 in accordance with the Yalta Agreement, would intervene in the civil war on the side of Mao's communists.

In February 1949, the incumbent Chinese foreign minister's pleading with Washington for the Americans to mediate between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China was met with the words: "The solution to China's problems can only be brought about by the Chinese themselves." After a cycle of disappointments and hopes, doubts and mistrust, Washington had resigned itself to the fact that China would become communist and that Chiang and his loyalists would retreat to Taiwan. The "loss of China" had become inevitable.

For eight years, China had fought against the Empire of Japan. China could hardly have won alone against Japan's industrial, technological, and military superiority. Ultimately, it was the Japanese surrender following the American atomic bombings that ended this brutal war. On the other hand, it was precisely the Japanese, with their war of aggression, who had created a vacuum in China into which the communists moved when Chiang Kai-shek's strength ran out. The American historian and diplomat George Kennan wrote in 1962: "It is hardly conceivable that Mao Zedong would have been successful without the Second World War."

The solidarity celebrated by potentates Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un on this year's 80th anniversary in honor of the "anti-fascist" victory in World War II is sheer cynicism. It conceals a totalitarian mentality that has nothing to do with anti-fascism, but rather is an expression of an ongoing war against fundamental liberal values. Countries like Ukraine, Taiwan, and South Korea are prominently positioned on the front lines of this war.

Matthias Messmer is a social scientist, consultant and author.