<![CDATA[ Nascer 20 vezes ]]>

"From now on," Luís Montenegro concluded at the end of his defense last week in Parliament, "I will only answer to those who are as transparent as I am." The phrase, crowning an (apparently) exhaustive list of rustic lands, consultancy tasks, sentimental legacies from ancestors and hopes placed in descendants, has echoes of another famous protest of personal integrity, launched by Cavaco Silva almost 15 years ago: "To be more honest than me, you have to be born twice."

At the time, Cavaco wanted to clear up more than legitimate questions about the favors that BPN gave him before it exploded in the faces (and pockets) of the Portuguese people. Protesting his honesty was the quickest way to avoid answering for the relations he had with the banker Oliveira e Costa, his former Secretary of State for Tax Affairs who, in that capacity, negotiated tax amnesties with several major businessmen of the regime – some of whom would later emerge as founding shareholders of the bank.

Cavaco was born twice. Montenegro was able to be more convincing. Not only because what is known about his case is infinitely less scandalous than Cavaco's preferential shares or friendly real estate swaps, but also because Montenegro was called to defend himself in a motion of censure that Chega presented as a contest of character – and anyone can win a contest of character against André Ventura.

The rejection of the motion of censure – obvious, fair and appropriate – settled the matter, but did not resolve the problem. Let us look at some case studies: when Hernâni Dias sets up real estate companies while in office, he creates the appearance of wanting to benefit from the land law that he himself is drafting. This is an apparent conflict of interest, because there is no evidence that such exploitation ever took place. When a prime minister has a company equipped to buy and sell real estate – or, worse, provides confidential consultancy to anonymous clients – there is the potential for private businesses to profit from public decisions and networks of contacts and influence. Again, there is no evidence of abuse, but the potential is there.

It is not about convicting anyone for crimes not yet committed. It is about identifying risks and mitigating or eliminating them, so that they do not occur. In fact, this is the only advantage of apparent and potential conflicts of interest, compared to real ones: they are preventable in time. If only someone could do something about it. In Portugal, no one does. In the case of Hernâni Dias, the Entity for Transparency rushed to deny the former government official's allegations, announcing that it had not given any opinions or advice on how to prevent the companies he created from causing him trouble. Result: they caused trouble.

We live in a perverse system that forces politicians to resolve their own conflicts of interest, because no one else will do that. Note well: when called upon to decide on their own behalf, a politician deals with his conflict of interest… in a conflict of interest! Even if he implements the best solution in the world, it is always possible for an opponent to accuse him of using his position to his advantage.

Let's get on with the job halfway: we have transparency mechanisms that allow us to identify problems (yes, with many flaws and a constant temptation to sabotage the scrutiny). But once identified, we have no one to suggest solutions to them, to prevent clashes between public and private interests. We are left watching the case of the week drip by, which is then discussed in the reductive logic of knowing whether the person involved is "serious" or dishonest. Until we understand that we need qualified institutions, our politicians could be born 20 times, and we will not stop this bleeding.